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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 05/03/2011

Accident number: 644

Accident time: 08:20

Accident Date: 11/07/2010
Country: Jordan

Where it occurred:
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M14 AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
hard
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 05/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: 36. 15353 E

Map north: 32. 52307 N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
non injurious accident (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
use of rake (?)
standing to excavate (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)

Accident report
An internal demining group accident report was made available. The conversion into a DDAS
file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial.
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The internal report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Incident investigation [Demining group] – MINE ACTION TEAM - JORDAN
GRID REF: 32. 52307 N: 36. 15353 E
MINEFIELD NO – 365, minefield TASK ID- swailmeh 3
Investigation conducted by – [Demining group], [Name removed]
Deminer: [The Victim]: NIC NO: [Removed]
TEAM LEADER: [Name removed], Team: Uniform
TIME OF INCIDENT: 08:20 hrs. DATE OF INCIDENT: 11 July 2010
NATURE OF INJURY: Nil
TYPE OF MINE: M14 AP MINE

IMSMA DETAILED REPORT FOR MINE INCIDENT, Sunday, 11 July 2010
Part 1 – Description of the incident
1. Organisation name: [Demining group], JORDAN. Team No: Uniform
2. Incident date: 11 July 2010. Time: 08:20 hrs
3. Location of incident: NE SECTOR, Province: Mafraq, Village: Swailmeh, Project or task
No: Swailmeh 3 (365)
4. Name of site manager or team leader: [Name removed]
5. Type of incident: uncontrolled detonation of a mine.
6. Device was detonated by: Deminer
7. Device detonated while: Raking
8. Device was found in an area classified as: a known Hazardous Area
9. Narrative (Describe how the incident happened. Attach additional pages and photographs
or diagrams to assist in clarifying the circumstances surrounding the incident):
The Deminer located the signal on one cluster in SML10 and he followed the procedure by
approaching the signal from right side, and left side and accidentally he hit the M14 mine by
the heavy rake from the top which caused the blast.
Part 2 – Injuries
10. Did the incident result in any injuries? No
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[The report included a photograph of a small scratch on the Victim’s arm (he appears to have
been working with his sleeves rolled up).]
11. List people injured and nature of injury: [None]
Part 3 – Equipment damages
12. Did the incident result in any damage to equipment or property? Yes
13. List any mine action equipment or property damage:
Heavy Rake, Damaged (not reusable)
14. List damage to equipment or property owned by a member of the public or the
government. Include contact details of the owner or responsible person. Heavy Rake,
Damaged (not reusable)
Part 4 – Explosive hazard
15. Provide details of mines/UXO/ other devices that were involved in the incident.
Device Type:
AP (Blast) Mine

Method:
Buried

Determined by:
Raking

16. State specific device (if known): Anti-Personal Mine M14
17. Comments (include measurements of any crater resulting from the explosion): Crater
Depth: approx. 20 cm / Width: approx. 40 cm
Part 5 - Site conditions
18. Describe the conditions at the site at time of the incident
Ground/Terrain: Medium hard, Flat
Weather: Clear, Mild
Vegetation: Burnt, none
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[The accident site.]
Part 6 – Team and task details
20. Qualifications of Member(s) involved in the incident:
[The Victim], Deminer
21. How long had this team been?
a. At this site? 45 days
b. working on this task? 45 days
c. working on the day? 1 Hours & 50 minutes
22. Detector type: F3. Serial Number: 75 N17 407. Detector status: Functional. Passed to ,
[Name removed] for technical inspection at Swailmeh 3 Site on 11 of July 201. Tripwire
feeler used? No.
23. Hand tool: HEAVY RAKE
24. PPE: Vest, Visor, [Blast boots]
25. Comments: [None]
Part 7 - Medical & First Aid
Medical treatment required? no
26. Medical Support at Incident Site: Medic, 1st Aid Kit, Stretcher, Ambulance, Radio to call
forward medic.
27. Was a Mine Incident Drill carried out? Yes
28. Time and distance data
a. Time from incident to SECTION MEDICAL POINT: ( 1 ) minutes
b. Time spent at site administering treatment: N/A)
c. Time from evacuation FROM to arrival King Abdullah Hospital: N/A
Part 8 – Reporting procedures
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Reported by: , [Name removed], [Demining group] Jaber Office to: [Demining group] Offices &
NCDR
Investigation conducted by: [Name removed]
Report compiled/translated by: [Name removed], [Name removed]
Verified by: [Name removed]

FINDINGS
Marking system was not applied on the ground during approaching to the mine. Triangle
marker drill was not applied on the ground during excavation. Guessing and scratching were
noted on the ground around the incident area. Approaching to the mine was done from both
sides, left and right
Signed: Tech. & Ver. Coord

Operation Manager Recommendation
The incident happened due an individual mistake while the deminer investigating an indicated
signal by the metal detector in the predicted site of the AP mine within the cluster.
The deminer mis approach the mine and hit it from the top which caused the heavy RAKE to
press the pressure plate and activated the mine about 2m from the deminer (the length of the
RAKE handle). This the second incident with the same deminer and the same scenario.
The photos and investigating the incident site shows that the deminer make some changes to
the incident site (which is against the [Demining group]/NBP SOP) and a lack of supervision
and control from the team leader.
Signed: Operations Manager

Attachments:
Statements by Injured Members
Statements by Witnesses
Photographs of Incident Site
Copy of Incident Report

Victim Report
Victim number: 827

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: N/A

Time to hospital: N/A

Protection issued: blast boots

Protection used: Frontal apron, Mask
visor, blast boots

Frontal apron
Mask Visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Arm
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Statements
Statement 1: the Victim
That was my first day on this area as I finished my previous site on Thursday and then I was
sent to this new area to finish what the deminer [Name removed] started.
While am using the detector I heard a signal, checked it according to the SOPs using the light
and heavy rakes, while am using the heavy rake the explosion happened, nothing happened
to me and I walked out of the field.
Q, A:
Q: Did you make the right procedures in detecting and progressing to the signal?
A: Yes, I did. (Note: the deminer explained exactly what he did following the SOPs)
Q: Was the detector working well before the accident?
A: Yes, it was.
Q: what was the depth of the exploded mine as a suggestion?
A: around 16cm.
Q: were the mines near superficial or deep?
A: they were on 5-7cm.
Q: Were you having any problems that day?
A: No, and I asked them not to take me to the hospital.
Note: , [Name removed] checked the detector and he said nothing wrong with it.

Statement 2: Team Leader
I was checking on the deminer, [Name removed] then went to, [Name removed] site when I
heard a sound of AP mine explosion, I knew it was from the site of the de-miner [the Victim]. I
informed the sector coordinator and medic about it and saw the deminer getting out of the
field walking.
Q, A:
Q: Did you check on the injured site that day?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Did you notice anything wrong with the injured that day?
A: No.
Q: What was his productivity when the accident happened?
A: around 12 m².
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Q: Did you give your team the safety brief before they started working?
A: Yes.
Note: the nearest deminer to the accident was , [Name removed] but he was busy and didn’t
notice what happened exactly.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that there was a “lack of supervision and control from the Team Leader”
that including altering evidence at the accident site. The secondary cause is listed as
Unavoidable because it seems likely that the Victim was working as directed when the
accidental initiation occurred.
The demining group who made this report available is thanked for its transparency and its
professional concern to share lessons that can be learned from accidents. This record, along
with several other records where rakes were used, provide compelling evidence that the
controlled use of rakes can be both effective and tolerably safe (reducing risk of severe injury
to tolerable levels).
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